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Abstract: The article revisits and seeks to clarify and provide 
with new perspectives the debate between the theoretical 
approaches of four authors – Michel Villey, Brian Tierney, 
John Finnis and Javier Hervada – in their accounts of the 
contemporary formulation of the concept of «ius». Al-
though all authors analyzed in the paper share common 
thomistic roots in their respective argumentations on the 
essential meaning and content of the concept of «right», 
they still differ in their accounts with regard to the under-
standing of Aquinas’s classical juridical realism, the rela-
tion between «law» and «right» and the role of subjective 
rights in history and in today’s juridical discourse. The pa-
per seeks to highlight how such comparative perspective 
reveals not only the contrasts in the theoretical accounts of 
these authors with regard to the structural «locus» of the 
focal point of juridicity, but also renders manifest certain 
perspectives of integration of each approach with contri-
butions achieved by the other interlocutors of the debate.
Keywords: classical juridical realism; right; ius; law; natu-
ral law; juridicity; Aquinas, Villey, Tierney, Finnis, Hervada.
Resumen: El artículo revisa y busca aclarar y proporcionar 
con nuevas perspectivas el debate entre los enfoques teó-
ricos de cuatro autores –Michel Villey, Brian Tierney, John 
Finnis y Javier Hervada– en sus relatos de la formulación 
contemporánea del concepto de «ius». Aunque todos los 
autores analizados en el documento comparten raíces 
tómisticas comunes en sus respectivas argumentaciones 
sobre el significado y contenido esencial del concepto de 
«derecho», todavía difieren en sus relatos con respecto a 
la comprensión del realismo jurídico clásico de Tomás de 
Aquino. El artículo busca destacar cómo esta perspectiva 
comparativa revela no sólo los contrastes en los relatos 
teóricos de estos autores con respecto al «locus» estruc-
tural del punto focal de la juridicidad, sino que también 
pone de manifiesto ciertas perspectivas de integración de 
cada enfoque con las contribuciones alcanzadas por los 
otros interlocutores del debate.
Palabras clave: realismo jurídico clásico; derecho; ius; ley; 
la Ley natural; juridicidad; Aquinas; Villey; Tierney; Finnis; 
Hervada.
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intRoduction
It seems that today’s common answer to an enduring problem of legal philo-sophy – namely, what is the ground of things that are owed and how is it that someone can claim «this is owed to me» 1 – amounts to the understanding of 
the juridical phenomenon exclusively in two foundational categories: that of 
the positive legal norm (juridical fact in the objective sense) and that of sub-
jective right-claim (juridical fact in the subjective sense) 2. In the second half of 
the twentieth century a French philosopher of law, Michel Villey, published a 
series of articles and books in which he challenged these dominant understan-
dings of «right» 3. Instead of identifying the essence of the juridical phenome-
non with a system of norms as rules of conduct 4, or to a concept of subjective 
rights conceived predominantly as powers in function of the individual and 
his liberties 5, Villey proposed a restatement of the classical realistic concept of 
«right» – «ius» – as conceived by Aristotle, the jurists of Ancient Rome and 
1 hittingeR, R., The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World, ISI 
Books, Wilmington, 2003, p. 115.
2 eRRázuRiz, C. J., «Sul rapporto tra diritto e giustizia: valore e attualità della tradizione classica 
e Cristiana», Persona y Derecho, 40 (1999), pp. 337-359. See also, villey, M., Le droit et les droits 
de l’homme, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983, pp. 24-25.
3 Since this paper seeks to present various proposals for a contemporary restatement of the an-
tique and medieval concept of «ius», throughout the paper we will use the term «right» primar-
ily in a sense that corresponds to this pre-modern concept, namely, as something that objectively 
indicates what is just. The term «right» is capable of designating this objective sense in most 
European languages («droit» in French, «derecho» in Spanish, «diritto» in Italian), despite the 
dominant contemporary cultural tendency to understand this term in the sense of subjective 
rights as faculties of claiming. In the English language, however, the juridical phenomenon 
in its objective meaning is usually denoted by the term «law», whereas the term «right» is re-
served exclusively for the category of rights understood in the modern subjective sense. For the 
difficulties in harmonizing the legal terminology of the European continental tradition and the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition with regard to the translations of the concept of «ius», see caPaRRos, 
E., «Presentation of the English Edition», in heRvada, J., Critical Introduction to Natural Law, 
Wilson & Lafleur Ltée, Montréal, 2006, pp. xi-xiii; voilley, G., «Translator’s Introduction», 
in villey, M, «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part One)», Griffith Law Review, 9 (2000), 
p. 75. This latter article is an English translation of villey, M., «Abrégé du droit naturel clas-
sique», in Lecons d’histoire de la philospohie du droit, Dalloz, Paris, 2002, pp. 109-165. The text was 
originally published in the 1961 edition of Archives de philosophie du droit.
4 villey, M., «Sur les essais d’application de la logique déontique au droit», Archives de philosop-
hie du droit, 17 (1972), p. 407; id., «Le droit dans les choses», in aMselek, P. and gRzegoR-
czyk, c. (ed.), Controverses autour de l’ontologie du droit, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 
1989, p. 12.
5 villey, M., «Dikaion – Torah (II). Seconde scolastique», in Critique de la pensée juridique moder-
ne, Dalloz, Paris, 1976, p. 35.
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St. Thomas Aquinas. His research catalyzed a debate in legal philosophy and 
history on many levels.
In this paper we will present the course of the debate circumscribed to 
the conceptual exchange of ideas between four authors: Michel Villey, Brian 
Tierney, John Finnis and Javier Hervada. All these authors share a common 
philosophical framework – a proposal for some form of recovery of the clas-
sical thomistic approach to the juridical phenomenon. Still, they differ sig-
nificantly on a number of particular arguments regarding the essence of the 
classical concept of «ius» and of the concrete modalities of its contemporary 
restatement. While presenting their arguments, we will attempt to identify the 
focal point of juridicity in their respective accounts of the concept of «right» – i.e., 
what, in the ultimate juridical analysis, constitutes something as «right» 6. 
Such analysis will serve to illuminate the conceptual differences between these 
four authors, and perhaps cast light on certain perspectives of integration of 
particular arguments into their respective theories.
Another reason to focus precisely on these four authors lies in the fact 
that they themselves often developed an argumentation on the concept of 
«right» in direct (or at least implicit) dialogue with one another. Thus, they 
have created a distinctive, at times mutually critical, dialogical body of work 
that the reader could benefit from reading as a single argumentative stream.
Although numerous pages of their debate were devoted also to the issues 
of historical and terminological matters, we will focus on these levels of debate 
only collaterally and insofar as they contribute to a clearer understanding of 
strictly juridical determination of the concept of «ius».
Recently, when referring to this debate, one of its participants affirmed 
that it is «deeply regrettable that so much scholarly time has been diverted to 
tracing differences that are in the last analysis almost imaginary» 7. This paper 
attempts to challenge this claim by showing that the scientific conversation of 
6 For this task, we will adopt the understanding of the concept of «juridicity» of Javier Hervada, 
the only author among the four presented in the paper to give a systematic account of this 
concept. However, for the purposes of this paper, we shall initially employ Hervada’s concept 
of juridicity in its broader meaning on a «content-neutral» level of abstraction in order to filter 
through it the theoretical accounts of each author. In this broader meaning Hervada under-
stands «juridicity» as essentially the formal constitutive factor of the specifically juridical dimen-
sion in facts and relations. As such, it has a focal point – a concrete cause that renders the fact or 
relation in question juridical. 
7 Finnis, J., «Grounding Human Rights in Natural Law», American Journal of Jurisprudence, 60 
(2015), p. 214.
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the authors in question constitutes a central contribution to a more adequate 
understanding of the concept of «right», as well as to the contemporary re-
covery of the classical concept of «ius».
1. Michel villey, «Right» as «just shaRe» and the cRitique 
oF suBjective Rights
In a series of books and articles published throughout the second half of the 
last century, the French philosopher of law, Michel Villey, was the first 8 author 
to put forward a proposal for the restoration of the classical realistic concept of 
«right», in contrast to the modern semantics of conceiving the legal phenomena 
in a predominantly subjectivist sense. Villey claimed that the concept of «sub-
jective rights» has been the central notion for the systematic elaboration of legal 
science since the fourteenth century 9. William Ockham, Hugo Grotius, Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant and other authors who approached the 
legal phenomena through the optic of «subjective rights» have constructed their 
theories around an understanding of «ius» that posits the individual, the descrip-
tion of his juridical qualities and faculties, as the systematic starting point 10.
«All they discern in [nature as the source of subjective rights] are indivi-
dual ‘rights’, powers or liberties, naturally unlimited as long as the positive 
law proceeding from the assent of citizens (and therefore indirectly procee-
ding from these very liberties) does not limit them» 11.
1.1. Villey’s Preference for the Classical Realistic Concept of «Right»
Villey highlights that this modern notion of «right» is born in clear 
contrast to the classical, objective concept of «ius» 12, developed by Aristot-
le («dikaion»), the Roman jurisprudence and Thomas Aquinas within the 
8 Villey’s proposal for the revival of the classical pre-modern concept of «right» in today’s le-
gal culture dominated by the category of «subjective right» was labelled a «detonator» of his 
entrance to the world of the philosophy of law. See RaBBi-Baldi caBanillas, R., La filosofía 
jurídica de Michel Villey, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1990, p. 438.
9 villey, M., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part Two)», Griffith Law Review, 10 (2001), p. 171. 
10 villey, M., La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 
2013, p. 228.
11 villey, M., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part Two)», op. cit., p. 171.
12 Ibidem. 
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philosophical framework of metaphysical realism 13. In this classical realistic 
framework, the juridical dimension, the «right», was inherent in «nature». 
The jurists of antiquity and medieval times have approached the concept of 
«ius» from «the observation of the order inherent in the social body, (...) of 
the ‘cosmic nature’» 14. In order to understand «right» in classical juridical 
realism, Villey affirms that one must abandon the modern exclusive perspec-
tive of the centrality of the individual person, his powers and desires, and 
«entirely free oneself from these post-Kantian concepts which are so deeply 
embedded in contemporary thought» 15. In the first place, this entails an un-
derstanding of «ius» as the object of the virtue of justice. The two terms are so 
closely interwoven that Aristotle used the same term («dikaion») to designate 
both «justice» and «right». Thomas Aquinas defined «ius» precisely as the 
object of justice, «that which is just», in the Treatise on Justice of his Summa 
Theologiae 16. Secondly, «ius» is essentially defined with relation to a prior or-
der impressed in the nature of things 17. and which justice a posteriori seeks to 
procure. Therefore, according to Villey, between a prior «cosmic» order and 
the posterior act of justice (which consists in «giving» 18, procuring this order) 
there is an intermediary dimension which delineates the very object of «giv-
ing» according to the prior order. And that peculiar dimension determines the 
content of the concept of «ius».
«In order to establish the right (...) classical juridical science does not 
begin with the individual, but objectively, with the bulk of social goods to be 
shared. The right of each is a quota. A right is not therefore the ‘attribute’ 
of the individual considered in isolation, but a thing, an objective thing (an 
‘incorporeal thing’), a delimited quantity of prerogatives or duties» 19.
13 villey, M., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 224.
14 id., «La genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d’Occam», Archives de philosophie du droit, 9 
(1964), p. 103. This English translation from the French original text (as well as the other trans-
lations from the respective authors’ original writings in French, Spanish or Italian throughout 
this paper) is ours. 
15 id., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part One)», op. cit., p. 81.
16 Thomas Aquinas, S.Th. II-II, q. 57.
17 «There is no other procedure [for the determination of the just allocation, the ‘portion due to 
each’ in defining the relations between two persons juridically] but to interrogate nature, and to 
attempt to recognize the order which it perhaps conceals – an objective, and therefore juridical 
order». villey, M., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part One)», op. cit., p. 96.
18 «In its specific meaning, justice tends to give to each his own (suum cuique tribuere)...», see ibid., 
pp. 85-86; «(...) justice means to ‘allocate to each his right’...», see ibid., p. 94.
19 villey, M., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part Two)», op. cit., p. 174. 
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Within classical juridical realism the concept of «ius» denotes the «ob-
jective just relation» 20 constituted by a just and harmonious order inherent 
in the «natural social body» 21, in which every person and each thing finds its 
well fixed place 22. «Ius» as «objective just relation» is, then, such «just pro-
portion» that exists between external things (res exteriores) distributed between 
persons 23.
Applied to the individual person, «ius» can only be defined, according 
to Villey, as a «share» that belongs to him in justice. From the perspective 
of the individual, «ius» is his personal status, his juridical condition, or, gen-
erally, that precise thing (those immovables, credits, debts, utilities or ad-
vantages) which constitutes his «share» within the objective just relation 24. 
However, «ius» can, according to Villey, be transposed to signify a juridical 
phenomenon strictly from the perspective of the individual person only in a 
secondary structural moment, since it is never focalized exclusively in human 
nature considered in isolation. The content of the classical concept of «ius» 
is broader than mere subjective claims and advantages of the individual per-
son: «my right, that which is due me (...) may also be a sanction» 25. Indeed, 
the concept of «ius» implies an already fixed order of «supra-interpersonal» 
relations which limits the free-standing individual «power» and neutralizes 
its putative reformulation as an absolute juridical claim 26. Individual «power» 
is, thus, structurally located in the sphere of pre-juridical content which can 
never be formally constitutive of the essence of «ius».
Such understanding of «ius» imbued the mentality of Roman jurists, 
who, according to Villey, provided Aristotle’s «dikaion» (probably mediated 
through Stoic eclecticism), with the systematics of a «scientific form» 27. In 
classical Rome, «ius» was not identified, for example, with the «power» or 
right-claim of the creditor, but with the obligation itself – «vinculum iuris», the 
objective relation between the creditor and the debtor 28. It was also used to 
20 villey, M., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 103; id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 243.
21 id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 243.
22 id., «Les origines de la notion de droit subjectif», in Lecons d’histoire de la philospohie du droit, p. 
234.
23 id., «Dikaion – Torah (II)», op. cit., p. 42.
24 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 103.
25 id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 571.
26 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 104.
27 id., «Les origines de la notion...», op. cit., p. 235.
28 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 106.
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designate the whole regime or juridical institute pertaining to a legal condition or 
status of the individual person. Today’s legal culture, which was formed in the 
framework of «subjective rights», finds it very hard to understand, and even to 
translate a concrete application of the term «ius», for example, when declaring 
a «right not to elevate one’s immovables» («ius altius non extollendi») 29. But in 
Roman juridical culture, as well as in twelfth-century medieval culture steeped 
in the legal renaissance of Roman juridical categories, «right» is essentially 
a «share» in a thing allocated through a natural order, and not power over 
things 30. Even though Villey does not deny that factual juridical «situations» 
later qualified by the term «subjective rights» were already present in Roman 
legal language, and Roman jurists certainly knew that individuals have powers 
attributed to them 31, the classical juridical culture never envisaged such «pow-
ers» as being vested with the essence of the concept of «right» 32.
1.2. The Genesis of the Concept of «Subjective Rights»
Although Villey admits that it is not easy to determine with precision the 
exact moment when the term «ius» began to signify essentially the «subjective 
right», he proposes a chronology of various philosophical stages which con-
tributed to the crossing of the «watershed» 33 from the classical to the modern 
vision of «right». He refers to these stages of development as «gradual slides» 
(«glissements») 34.
The first contributing factor was, according to Villey, the Christian cul-
tural influence with regard to the increasing appreciation of the value of indi-
vidual’s dignity and initiative. At the same time, a juridical Augustinianism fa-
29 villey, M., «Les institutes de Gaius et l’idée du droit subjective», in Lecons d’histoire de la phi-
lospohie du droit, p. 182.
30 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 107.
31 id., «Les institutes de Gaius...», op. cit., p. 185; id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 105.
32 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 105. To claim the opposite would, according to Villey, 
amount to a forced projection of modern categories of subjective rights retroactively to Roman 
law. See villey, M., «Les institutes de Gaius...», op. cit., p. 169.
33 id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 261. We preferred here to translate the French ex-
pression «ligne de partage» originally used by Villey, with an English word of similar meaning 
– «watershed» – because it is later also used, as we shall see, by other authors presented in this 
paper, to denote the same argumentative moment. See Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, 2d ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 206-7, 424, 465-6.
34 villey, M., «Les origines de la notion...», op. cit., p. 238. 
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voured the postulate of moral law (understood as essentially rules of conduct) 
as a unique source of juridicity, reduced largely to the sole moral dimension 
of individual human action 35. The second factor was the dissolution of Roman 
legal institutions, as well as the subsequent stratification of medieval society 
into networks of powers and initiatives, whereby each social group envisioned 
its proper juridical status in the predominant terms of «advantages» 36. Villey 
highlights that the jurisprudential work of medieval «glossators» hinted in 
numerous aspects at the formation of the modern subjectivist juridical lan-
guage. The «glossators’» texts, however, did not yet place «ius» in the con-
ceptual realm of faculties or claims understood essentially in the subjectivist 
sense 37. Still, the thirteenth century work of Thomas Aquinas witnesses to a 
mainstream juridical mentality which, as Villey highlights, clearly shows the 
intention to understand «ius» as an autonomous concept, elaborated by the 
Angelic Doctor in question 57 of IIa IIae in his Summa Theologiae. Even Aqui-
nas’s systematization bears witness to his understanding that «ius» is simply 
not reducible to the matters of law as rules of conduct, treated in a structurally 
separate part of his Summa – Ia IIae 38. In Villey’s reading of Aquinas, nothing 
could be further from the concept of «ius» than to predicate individual «pow-
er» to its essential meaning 39, or to define «ius» as essentially a «law», rather 
than as a just thing («res iusta») 40.
35 villey, M., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., pp. 110-111; id., «Les origines de la notion...», op. 
cit., p. 238; id., «Dikaion – Torah (II)», op. cit., p. 39. Villey refers to this stage as the «eclipse» 
of the concept of «ius» as the just distribution of things in favour of the «law», or the period 
when Torah absorbed the «dikaion». See villey, M., «Dikaion – Torah (II)», op. cit., pp. 37-39. 
This juridical Augustinianism favoured a biblical vision of justice, not influential to Aristotle or 
to Roman jurists, which subsequently led to a confusion and, ultimately, absorption of right by 
morality. See villey, M., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 240.
36 id., «Les origines de la notion...», op. cit., pp. 238-239; id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., pp. 
249-250.
37 «The subjective sense of the word ‘ius’ still constitutes but an accidental feature, a reflection of 
the principal sense». villey, M., «Les origines de la notion...», op. cit., p. 240. This particular 
argument will be the immediate object of numerous subsequent critiques – especially by Brian 
Tierney – on a historical level and with reflections on a juridical level of argumentation.
38 id., «Dikaion – Torah (II)», op. cit., pp. 39-40.
39 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 107.
40 id., «Si la théorie générale du droit, pour Saint Thomas, est une théorie de la loi», Archives de 
philosophie du droit, 17 (1972), p. 428; «It is in this textual locus where St. Thomas, while explicitly 
treating the problem of the definition of right, firmly distinguishes between ‘ius’ and ‘lex’. It is of 
little interest to me that in other places of the text, where this problem was not at issue, he may 
happen to tend toward a contrary and improper language of some of the authorities he refers to 
(...)». See villey, M., «Sur les essais...», op. cit., p. 408.
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Even if the idea of the «gradual slide» towards a subjectivist sense of 
«ius» is already practical in juridical experience, and probably latent in opin-
ion and in vulgar semantics in the Middle Ages, Villey claims that nothing 
permits us to conclude that the word «ius» was meant to essentially denote 
«subjective right» before the fourteenth century 41. For a definitive crossing 
of the «watershed» from the classical to the modern vision of «right», a new 
contextual vision of the world, contrasted to the ancient classical one, was 
needed 42.
«In fact, knowing the exact date of birth of subjective right (which is, 
after all, impossible to determine with certainty) leaves me completely indi-
fferent; what interests me is to understand which philosophical and juridical 
system this concept is in solidarity with» 43.
The ultimate foundations of Villey’s arguments are not primarily his-
torical. He seeks to explain the genesis of «subjective rights» on a deeper 
level of progressively individualistic social dynamics. In his view, juridical 
subjectivism is the direct effect of a philosophical context which gravitates 
around the individual and the juridical priority of his «powers», liberties, 
utilities and interests 44. Villey was convinced that William Ockham ulti-
mately provided the subjectivist tendencies of medieval legal discourse with 
systematic rigour in his fourteenth century works, such as Opus nonaginta 
dierum (1332-1334) and, more generally, Breviloquium (1341-1342). Within 
his nominalist philosophy, Ockham identified the concept of «right» es-
sentially with a system of individual «powers», where the «potestas absoluta 
et legislativa» of God is the supreme centre of power, while networks of 
subordinated powers and laws of social groups and individuals are thereby 
derived 45. According to Villey, the Copernican revolution which was trig-
gered in the fourteenth century was subsequently fully developed by Hugo 
41 villey, M., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 110.
42 id., «Les origines de la notion...», op. cit., . 244.
43 id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., pp. 260-261.
44 See sol, T., «La controverse Villey-Tierney sur la naissance du droit subjectif au XIIe siècle: 
difficultés et valeur heuristique d’un anachronisme conceptual», in lauRent-Bonne, n. and 
PRévost, x. (ed.), Penser l’ordre juridique médiéval et moderne. Regards criosés sur les méthodes 
des jurists, Lextenso éditions, LGDJ, Paris, 2016, p. 218. See also villey, M., «La genèse du 
droit...», op. cit., p. 121.
45 villey, M., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., pp. 120-127.
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Grotius in the sixteenth century. After that, «right» would no longer be 
understood as an objective just relation established by a prior fixed order of 
individual and social ontology 46.
«Already with William Ockham we have seen nominalism generate both 
juridical positivism and the idea of subjective right (...) He will posit the idea 
of individual power or the subjective right and all its derivations, like that of 
the law understood as an emanation of individual power, at the centre of ju-
ridical science. He will discard any other possible source of the juridical or-
der, and deny any possibility of extracting juridical relations from nature» 47.
1.3.  A Critical Assessment of Villey’s Concept of «Right» and the Focal Point 
of Juridicity
Villey was convinced that classical juridical realism is capable of «providing 
the same services» of today’s semantics of subjective rights and liberties, «while 
using another, more accurate language» 48. The pre-modern concept of «ius» 
and all its linguistic apparatus is simply more adequate to conceptually grasp the 
essence of «right». In this perspective, the category of subjective rights cannot 
be viewed, according to Villey, as a product of conceptual progress or evolution. 
«Ius» and subjective rights are two different, concurring concepts 49.
But why is the classical realistic concept of «right» superior to the notion 
of subjective rights?
As we have seen, Villey is convinced that any attempt to systematically 
posit the focal point of juridicity essentially in the «powers», liberties, in-
terests and utilities of the individual is defective and impoverishes juridical 
46 villey, M., «Les origines de la notion..., op. cit., pp. 221-227. The exact term itself – «subjective 
right» – seems to appear for the first time in the eighteenth century works of the jurist Georg 
Darjes (1714-1791), who was the first to propose the designation of this term as applied to «ius» 
considered essentially as a faculty of the individual. Regardless of the concrete history of termi-
nological nuances, Villey highlights that Ockham’s work was decisive in this conceptual (rather 
than terminological) «revolution». For the genesis and development of the term «subjective 
right», especially with regard to Georg Darjes, see guzMán BRito, a., «Historia de la denom-
inación del derecho-facultad como ‘subjectivo’», Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos, 25 (2003), 
pp. 421-422, 426-427, 434-435, 437-441; See also villey, M., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., 
pp. 100-102.
47 id., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., p. 272
48 id., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part Two)», op. cit., p. 172.
49 sol, T., «La notion de droit subjectif chez Villey et Hervada», Ius Ecclesiae, 28 (2016), p. 324.
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discourse. By structurally relegating any prior natural order – or what is left of 
it after nominalistic and kantian deconstruction of universals such as «human 
nature» – to a meta-juridical dimension and by predicating juridicity exclusive-
ly to individual «powers» limited only by positive law, we are trapped in the 
framework of legal positivism.
Villey’s Anglo-Saxon contemporaries centred the juridical debate on 
questions of whether and how positivism should be grounded in some kind 
of morality 50, on the need to secure a «minimum content of natural law» 51, or 
on an attempt to establish a link between «right» and the thomistic tradition 
of natural law 52. Villey seems to have been mostly unconvinced of the neces-
sity to graft the concept or «right» directly on the theory of natural law, in 
order to provide some moral grounding to the specifically juridical dimension. 
Instead, he clearly claimed that «ius» cannot be reduced to a derivation from 
moral law 53 and that moral law (which guides the moral conduct or the indi-
vidual) does not have the primary purpose to measure the «just proportion» 54.
50 haRt, H.L.A., «Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals», Harvard Law Review, 71 
(1958), pp. 593-629; FulleR, L.L., «Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor 
Hart», Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), pp. 630-672.
51 «Indeed, the continued reassertion of some form of Natural Law doctrine is due in part (...) 
to the fact that despite a terminology, and much metaphysics, which few could now accept, it 
contains certain elementary truths of importance for the understanding of both morality and 
law. These we shall endeavour to disentangle from their metaphysical setting and restate here 
in simpler terms (...) Such universally recognized principles of conduct which have a basis in 
elementary truths concerning human beings, their natural environment, and aims, may be con-
sidered the minimum content of Natural Law, in contrast with the more grandiose and more 
challengeable constructions which have often been proffered». See haRt, H.L.A., The Concept 
of Law, 2d ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 188, 193.
52 Almost all philosophers of law rooted in the thomistic tradition in the last half a century, regard-
less of their mutual critiques on other aspects of the theory of natural law, ground both, natural 
rights and positive law in natural law almost without any reference to the classical realistic concept of 
«ius». See, for example, veatch, H. B., Human Rights: Fact or Fancy, Louisiana State University 
Press, Baton Rouge, 1985; geoRge, R. P., «Natural Law and Positive Law», in In Defense of 
Natural Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 102-112. Ralph McInerny was a 
rare example of engaging with Villey’s thesis when discussing the juridical (hence, not merely 
historical) structural link between «ius» and natural law. See McineRny, R., «Natural Law and 
Human Rights», American Journal of Jurisprudence, 36 (1991), pp. 1-14. 
53 villey, M., «Dikaion – Torah (II)», pp. 40, 42.
54 id., «Si la théorie générale...», op. cit., pp. 429-430. «First of all (...) the science of the just, 
as I presented it, is but a moment of morality. It is one thing to define objectively the just relations 
(justum – ius); it is another thing to penetrate the intention which makes man subjectively just». 
See villey, M., «Epitome of Classical Natural Law (Part One)», op. cit., p. 88. Italics in the 
quotation are reported from the original text. 
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Interestingly, in at least one place of his work, Villey does seem to open 
up a structural space for a consideration of «right» as an «effect» (and not 
mere deduction) of the law, insofar as law is intended to denote the «divine 
plan that governs the cosmic order» 55. Elsewhere, he explicitly claims that, 
according to the classical doctrine, «the just distribution, that is, the juridical 
order, corresponds to a law, which is, above all, natural law» 56. Unfortunately, 
he does not develop a complete theoretical account of the juridical dimension 
of natural law with regard to his concept of «right». Villey’s identification of 
natural law as solely a moral phenomenon, without taking into account its 
juridical dimension, could present a weakness to his theory, especially when 
confronted with his claim that «ius» is constituted according to an already fixed 
order. Postulating a juridical dimension to natural law could contribute to a 
more adequate explanation of the legal aspect of this fixed order, i.e., of the 
distribution prior to and constitutive of the «objective just relation».
As we have seen, there is no doubt that the very essence of the concept 
of «ius» is the «objective just relation», the «just share» that belongs to the 
person, or just «proportion» that exists between external things (res exteriores) 
distributed between persons. We shall not enter here into the details of the 
ongoing debate whether Villey understood «ius» as essentially a relation or 
substance 57. We should, however, address the question of what formally con-
stitutes the focal point of juridicity in his theory. It is clear that an external 
thing (in the broadest sense of the term, «res», a «thing», «une chose») 58 consti-
tutes the «share» (advantage or disadvantage) of the individual person accord-
ing to a prior fixed order. Since Villey negates any predication of juridicity to 
this prior fixed «cosmic» order, this thing, therefore, becomes due in justice 
(«just share») exclusively in the perspective of the objective just relation 59. The 
concept of «right» and the focal point of juridicity, hence, in the final analysis, 
could be seen as overlapping in his account, and reducible to the objective just 
relation. Nonetheless, while the concept of «right» is wholly identified with 
55 villey, M., «Si la théorie générale...», op. cit., p. 429.
56 id., La formation de la pensée...», op. cit., p. 593. Italics original. 
57 For two essential analysis on metaphysical categorization of Villey’s concept of «ius», see sol, T., 
«La notion de droit subjectif», pp. 334-344; schouPPe, J.-P., «Réflexions sur la conception du 
droit de M. Villey: une alternative à son rejet des droits de l’homme», Persona y Derecho, 25 
(1991), pp. 151-169.
58 id., «Le droit dans...», op. cit., p. 13. 
59 id., «La genèse du droit...», op. cit., p. 103.
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this relation, the focal point of juridicity is, on the other hand, structurally 
observed from a different perspective within this relation. Namely, an external 
thing becomes the individual’s «share» due in justice only insofar as it is pertain-
ing to the objective just relation.
2. BRian tieRney, histoRical cRiticisM oF villey’s thesis 
and the undeRlying concePt oF «Right»
2.1. Tierney’s Critique of Villey’s Thesis on the Genesis of Subjective Rights
A distinguished historian of medieval and modern origins of jurisprudence, 
political theory and Western constitutional thought, Brian Tierney, has present-
ed in his works what can truly be called a «most pertinent refutation of Villey’s 
thesis» 60. In his account of the origin of Western rights theories, based more on 
the analysis of occurrences of terminological aspects and on historical contexts 
than on a fully-fledged juridical argumentation, Tierney has claimed that vari-
ous elements of Villey’s theory of the concept of «ius» are «open to objections 
on points of detail» 61. The main points of Tierney’s critique, on a historical base, 
are the following. First, Roman jurists could have easily been more familiar with 
some forms of juridical discourse resembling the language pattern of individual 
rights than Villey is ready to concede (though not to the extent of undermin-
ing the essential meaning of «ius» as «objective just relation») 62. Second, the 
creative jurisprudence of twelfth century «glossators» of Roman law, as well 
60 sol, T., «La controverse...», op. cit., p. 214.
61 tieRney, B., «Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights», in The Idea of Natural 
Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625, Eerdmans, Grand 
Rapids, 2001, p. 30.
62 Ibid., pp. 15-19. Villey would have probably, as an answer to this critique, repeated his claim that 
philosophers of law from the modern subjectivist turn in fourteenth century onwards (including 
contemporary ones) often developed forced projections of modern categories of subjective rights 
retroactively to Roman law, thus pushing the Roman concept of «ius» – not easily translatable 
in modern languages – into a framework for which it was not originally coined. See villey, M., 
«Les institutes de Gaius...», op. cit., pp. 169-170. Tierney adds to his critique that Villey could 
have easily been overtly selective in the texts he chose to illustrate the meaning of «ius», draping 
his whole theory of right around them and discarding, to better suit his main arguments, other 
occurrences where language seems to have suggested a more subjectivist approach (for example, 
when terms «potestas» or «dominium» add a different aspect to the objectivist understanding of 
the term «ius»). See tieRney, B., «Villey, Ockham...», op. cit., pp. 17-18.
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as canonical texts from twelfth and thirteenth century, obviously articulated a 
language of subjective rights that could not be qualified simply as undifferentiated 
assemblage of mere references to usages in popular, vulgar discourse. This, ac-
cording to Tierney, seems to refute Villey’s argument on the fourteenth century 
semantic «copernican turn» he attributed to William Ockham 63.
Regardless of historical issues of texts and contexts, however relevant, the 
main point of our argumentation is centred on a juridical analysis of Tierney’s 
concept of «right» 64. Does Tierney engage in a juridical debate with Villey’s un-
derstanding of the concept of «ius», and, if so, can we synthesize particular traits 
of a contrasting concept of «right» underneath his historical argumentation?
2.2.  Tierney’s Juridical Critique of Villey’s Concept of «Right» and His 
Alternative Approach
Tierney begins his specifically juridical objection to Villey’s theory with 
his critique of the «whole conceptual framework» within which Villey’s cen-
tral thesis is set. Villey’s conceptual framework is, according to Tierney, based 
on the claim that a good theory of objective «right» can flourish only in an Ar-
istotelian thought-world, while individualist paradigm of Ockham’s thought-
world can only amount to a bad theory of subjective rights 65. Tierney develops 
63 tieRney, B., «Villey, Ockham...», op. cit., pp. 34-42. See also id., «Origins of Natural Rights Lan-
guage: Texts and Contexts, 1150-1250», in The Idea of Natural Rights, pp. 43-77. However, recent 
studies of Tierney’s historical critiques of Villey seem to shed a new, deeper light on the fact that me-
dieval «decretists», commentators of Gratian’s 1140 Decretum, were firmly rooted in an objectivistic 
framework of the classical realistic concept of «ius». The fact that they have at times availed them-
selves of subjectivist rights-language can be ascribed to their central interest in resolving particular 
problems, rather than providing conceptual apologetics of «ius». These recent studies, therefore, 
clearly display how the subjective-rights-discourse of the twelfth century «decretists» could have 
been semantically correlated with the classic terminology regarding the concept of «ius», without 
forcing the essentials of this concept in an individualist realm. See sol, T., «La notion de ius en droit 
sacramentaire chez Gratien et les décrétistes», Ius Ecclesiae, 27 (2015), pp. 380, 391-394.
64 As Sol points out, Tierney’s critique of Villey is essentially dependent on the aptitude of his-
torical and terminological issues for a successful transposition to the specific level of juridical 
argumentation. In other words, the main question is whether the historical and terminological 
analysis amount to a conclusion that the notion of subjective rights had already become the 
principal conceptual tool of juridical language prior to Ockham’s nominalist turn. See sol, T., 
«La controverse Villey-Tierney...», op. cit., pp. 225, 231-234; id., «La notion de ius...», op. cit., 
p. 380.
65 Tierney labels this approach as a «sort of Manichaean universe». See tieRney, B., «Villey, 
Ockham...», op. cit., p. 30.
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his objection to such a framework along two lines of argumentation, both 
pertinent to an adequate understanding of his concept of right.
In the first place, he is convinced that theories of individual rights need 
not necessarily depend on Ockhamist philosophical premises. He sees no rea-
son why metaphysical realism of Aristotle and Aquinas would be necessarily 
incongruous with «emphasis on individual rights» 66.
Tierney’s second line of argument is somewhat congenial to the first; 
he admits to his inability to envision why the three concepts – «ius» as clas-
sical objective right, natural law and subjective right – should be inherently 
inconsistent with one another. To begin with, he claims that, in a juridical 
discourse, one can simply «emphasize either the objective pattern of relation-
ships» («ius») or the «implied rights or duties of persons to one another – and 
then again one can focus on either the rights or the duties» 67. The classical 
«ius» as just order of human relationships already implies a structure of sub-
jective rights and duties. Tierney continuously claims that there is no essential 
qualitative difference between postulating the concept of «right» in terms of 
classical realist «ius» and in the framework of subjective rights. As he himself 
affirms, «the resulting works may be very different in tone and spirit, but the 
different emphases do not necessarily imply logical contradictions» 68. He is 
aware, however, that these are his own conclusions and he clearly acknowledg-
es that in Aquinas’s doctrine «right» cannot be said to have a dominant subjec-
tivist implication 69. In contrast to Aquinas’s views, however, Tierney leaves the 
classical realist «ius» almost completely outside of his juridical argumentation 
as superfluous 70. Throughout his analysis, Tierney develops the thesis that a 
contemporary postulate of the concept of «right» may abstain from a classical 
realist understanding of «ius» without losing anything significant from juridi-
cal argumentation other than mere «emphases», «tone» and «spirit».
«[There exists a] fallacy, widespread among modern jurists and philoso-
phers who are not medieval specialists, that if an idea is not to be found in 
Aquinas it is not really a medieval idea at all. Another explanation is possi-
66 Ibid., p. 31.
67 Ibid., p. 33.
68 Ibid., p. 34.
69 tieRney, B., «Natural Law and Natural Rights: Old Problems and Recent Approaches», The 
Review of Politics, 64 (2002), p. 393.
70 This has led some authors to conclude that Tierney’s concept of right is «fundamentally subjec-
tive». See sol, T., «La controverse Villey-Tierney...», op. cit., p. 223.
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ble. It may be that a juristic, distinctively non-Aristotelian theory of natural 
rights had grown up before Aquinas, that Aquinas did not choose to assi-
milate such ideas into his Christian-Aristotelian synthesis, but that they did 
enter the mainstream of Western political thought through other channels. 
This is the thesis I want to explore» 71.
Once the classical concept of «ius» is discarded as less than essential, 
Tierney seems to envision the concept of «right» within a structural realm 
of the exclusive interrelation between subjective (natural) rights and natural 
law. Although Tierney holds that Aquinas sometimes did use the terms «ius» 
and «lex naturalis» interchangeably, he affirms that the Angelic Doctor did, 
in fact, stop short from interrelating the two concepts into a single coherent 
doctrine 72. Nonetheless, in his own account of the interrelation between clas-
sical realist «ius» and natural law, Tierney highlights that the two concepts 
coexist harmoniously and could easily be read as complementary in Aquinas, 
to the extent that both retain the same principle as the underlying sense of 
rightness or fairness 73. How does Tierney understand their systematic com-
plementarity?
The concept of «right», in his view, must be founded on a structural 
interrelation of subjective right-claims with a specific aspect of natural law. The 
aspect of natural law that is foundational for a theory of rights, according to 
Tierney, is not the preceptive, but the permissive aspect 74. Although Aquinas did 
not assimilate the concept of permissive natural law into his system of «ius» 
and «lex naturalis» and thereby blocked himself from forming a unique coher-
ent doctrine of right and natural law, the concept was, according to Tierney, 
operational for the essential understanding of these juridical notions from the 
71 tieRney, B., «Origins of Natural...», op. cit., p. 45.
72 See tieRney, B., «Old Problems...», op. cit., pp. 392-394. See also tieRney, B., «Author’s Re-
joinder», The Review of Politics, 64 (2002), pp. 416-417.
73 The same underlying principle is affirmed, according to Tierney, when we observe that it is 
«proper for children to respect their parents» (objectively right relationship, «dikaion» or «ius») 
and if we say «honour thy father and thy mother» (natural law precept). See tieRney, B., «Vil-
ley, Ockham...», op. cit., p. 26.
74 tieRney, B., «The Idea of Natural Rights – Origins and Persistence», Northwestern Journal of 
International Human Rights, 2 (2004), p. 8. See also tieRney, B., «Villey, Ockham...», op. cit., pp. 
33, 44-45; id., «Origins of Natural...», op. cit., . 68; id., «Old Problems...», op. cit., pp. 399-406; 
id., «Author’s Rejoinder...», op. cit., pp. 416-420. Tierney devoted an entire book to a historical 
presentation of the concept of permissive natural law, see tieRney, B., Liberty and Law: The Idea 
of Permissive Natural Law, 1100-1800, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 
D.C., 2014.
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twelfth century onwards 75. Permissive natural law is that aspect of «lex natu-
ralis» which defines an area of human autonomy and free choice, inherently 
bounded by the preceptive aspect of natural law (and therefore not envisioned 
as a state of total, potentially destructive, license and unbounded liberty). In-
stead of forcing the two concepts – subjective (natural) rights and natural law 
– in a relation where the former is structurally derived from the latter, Tierney 
seeks to discover their interwoven ontological content, rooted in human na-
ture. According to his account, rights are manifest in the human capacity for 
free choice that requires a realm of individual autonomy for its exercise. At the 
same time, permissive natural law is conceived as person’s inherent power of 
free choice that can licitly be exercised within ontological and moral limits of 
the natural law in its preceptive mode. In such a scheme, subjective rights may 
be considered both as zones of autonomous power and as duties based on nat-
ural law, without an explicit reference to the classical realist concept of «ius» 76.
2.3.  Tierney’s Concept of «Right» and the Focal Point of Juridicity Inherent 
in His Argumentation – a Synthesis
Tierney’s insistence on the argumentative cluster of permissive natural 
law and subjective (natural) rights is paradigmatic to his understanding of the 
concept of «right».
«Right» is, as seen above, understood as fundamentally subjective right 
– a power or a claim – intrinsically rooted in the permissive aspect of natural 
law, which is, in turn, bounded by its preceptive structure. In a definitive ac-
count on the concept of «right», therefore, «ius» and «lex» cannot be struc-
turally separated, and the concept of «right» necessarily includes both, natural 
law and subjective rights.
But what is the focal point of juridicity, i.e., the formal constitutive factor 
of the juridical dimension regarding facts and relations, in Tierney’s theory?
It seems that in Tierney’s account juridicity cannot be focalized in the 
structure of subjective rights alone, since this structure is defined by powers 
75 tieRney, B., «Old Problems...», op. cit., p. 399. 
76 Ibid., pp. 401, 405. In Tierney’s definitive study on the subject of permissive natural law, Aqui-
nas’s realist concept of «ius» is never mentioned when doctrine on permissive natural law is 
assessed with regard to the juridical teachings of the Angelic Doctor. See tieRney, B., Liberty 
and Law..., op. cit., pp. 69-91.
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or claims rooted in the human capacity for free choice that requires a realm 
of individual autonomy for its exercise. Considered in isolation, the struc-
ture of subjective rights does not in itself formally constitute a specifically 
juridical dimension. Instead, what provides the structure of subjective rights 
with specifically juridical content, i.e., what situates facts and relations in 
the realm of juridical obligation, is the natural law. Subjective or «natural» 
rights are merely a structural extension in the form of an autonomous claim 
and individual power, but certainly not constitutive carriers of juridical ob-
ligation.
Therefore, juridicity is constituted, in the final analysis, by a (natural) 
legal norm: a law. Natural rights are correlative to (natural) legal norms. To 
give our definitive critical assessment of this structural move and its phil-
osophical effects for the understanding of the concept of «right», we shall 
first have to present the theory of another author, John Finnis, who, re-
gardless of his debates with Tierney on important points of historical detail, 
does not, as we shall seek to demonstrate, structurally differ from Tierney 
in any significant way as regards the concept of «right» and the focal point 
of juridicity.
3. john Finnis, the centRality oF PRinciPles oF PRactical 
ReasonaBleness and suBjective Rights
3.1.  A Dispute with Michel Villey on the Terminological Dichotomy between 
«Ius» and «Lex»
In his first published academic paper to engage explicitly with Michel 
Villey’s account of the concept of «right» in classical realism, John Finnis, the 
distinguished Australian professor of legal theory and philosophy of law, en-
tered the debate from a firmly defined argumentative position, which he will 
continue to sustain in his future works. On that occasion, Finnis criticized Vil-
ley’s thesis according to which the object of «ius» is the «just share of goods», 
and has put forward a contrasting argument. He argues that an Anglo-Saxon 
reader will not find in Aquinas anything resembling a «major opposition» be-
tween the terms «right» and «law» 77. For classical authors, continued Finnis, 
77 Finnis, J., «Un ouvrage récent sur Bentham», Archives de philosophie du droit, 17 (1972), p. 424.
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law (as the rule of the order of societies) and right (which is, in a certain way, 
a product of law) were so interwoven in their conceptual relation that these 
authors occasionally confused one with the other. Villey’s claim that the task of 
the jurist consists in establishing the «just relation» met with Finnis’s response 
that Aquinas has not substantially addressed this task in his Treatise De Iure Et 
Iustitia, but in the Treatise De Lege of his Summa Theologiae 78.
In a response published together with Finnis’s text, Villey attempted to 
clarify the dispute by indicating what he took to be Finnis’s conceptual confu-
sion between law and right. Law is essentially a rule of conduct, the purpose 
of which is to «direct human actions», to «make people good» and to conduct 
them towards both «common good» and their «happiness» or «beatitude». 
In Thomas Aquinas, right is, instead, never defined as a «law», but as a «just 
share», a thing, «res iusta». Villey pointed to Finnis’s refusal to «conceive of 
right as something self-standing with regard to law» and wondered whether 
the problem might indeed be more of a conceptual than merely of terminolog-
ical nature, given the fact that we cannot postulate a «specifically British in-
terpretation» of the Summa 79. Since the conceptual autonomy of «right» as a 
self-standing juridical category with regard to «law» (including natural law as 
a rule of moral conduct) is evident, Villey, with some academic despair, raised 
the question of how can it be not clear that «lex and ius manifest themselves 
as belonging to two different registers» 80? In other words, one may attempt to 
postulate otherwise, but such an approach is simply not the classical thomistic 
approach, among other critiques that could be addressed to it.
«Our author, therefore, always faithful to his legalistic departure point, 
sees right as necessarily derived from law (and that is one way of reducing 
right to law)» 81.
Are these qualifications that Villey attributed to Finnis («our author») 
really sustainable? Surely, Finnis should have been surprised to be called a «le-
galist», given the fact that the largest portion of his academic work through-
out the years has been dedicated to the defence and restatement of the natural 
law as the basis for human positive law. In what way did Villey’s and Finnis’s 
78 Ibid., pp. 424-425.
79 villey, M., «Si la théorie générale du droit», pp. 427-428.
80 Ibid., p. 428.
81 Ibid., p. 429.
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discussion transcend the exclusive focus on a historical and terminological di-
chotomy between «ius» and «lex» and, in fact, touched upon juridical and 
conceptual issues 82?
3.2.  Finnis’s Critique of Villey’s Classical Thomistic Understanding 
of «Ius» – Conceptual Issues
Finnis’s subsequent works reveal that he has continued to develop his 
concept of «ius» within a fixed framework in which «law» and «right» are 
necessarily interchangeable and interwoven, to the point where the latter is 
understood as, essentially, only a necessary logical extension of the meaning of 
the former. What could be the reasons for his reluctance and refusal to con-
ceptually integrate the classical thomistic understanding of «ius» as elaborated 
by Villey?
Part of the reason is surely located in Finnis’s firm conviction, expressed 
in his 1980 seminal work Natural Law and Natural Rights, that «the modern 
grammar of rights provides a way of expressing virtually all the requirements 
of practical reasonableness» 83. When referring to the «modern grammar of 
rights», Finnis understands under this category essentially «subjective rights». 
82 Surely a part of the terminological issue on the dichotomy between «ius» and «lex» owes to 
the fact that in the Anglo-Saxon legal culture the term «law» came to signify the only possible 
instance of the «right in the objective sense», whereas «right» could have only be used in ref-
erence to «subjective rights». This could have, indeed, constituted at least part of the problem 
for Finnis to enter, on a terminological level, into discussion with Villey’s realist concept of 
«right». The question, however, obviously transcends terminological issues, and moves towards 
conceptual and philosophical ones, since, to paraphrase Villey, the concept of «right» could not 
have a «specifically Anglo-Saxon philosophical interpretation». For a synthetical insight of the 
terminological issue mentioned here, see Pennington, K., «The History of Rights in Western 
Thought», Emory Law Journal, 47 (1998), p. 237. See also sol, T., «La controverse Villey-Tier-
ney...», op. cit., pp. 223-224. 
83 Finnis, J., Natural Law..., op. cit., p. 198. Without entering into further detail, it will suffice 
here to mention that in Finnis’s body of work the «principles», as well as the «requirements» 
of «practical reasonableness» represent his systematic equivalent to traditional conceptual ar-
guments of the more classical «natural law method». Throughout his work, while gradually 
substituting the traditional natural-law-terminology with his own methodological apparatus, 
Finnis occasionally reminds the reader that he is accomplishing essentially the same theoretical 
moves already present in the tradition of natural law, albeit qualified with his own insights. For 
example, on various occasions, when he asserts something with regard to «practical reasonable-
ness» he is careful to add the explanatory bracket «(.i.e. the tradition of ‘natural law’)». See ibid., 
pp. 102-103, 221.
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He famously compliments American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld for 
«accommodating satisfactorily» the modern grammar of (subjective) rights 
into a comprehensive scheme wherein «all assertions or ascriptions of rights 
can be reduced without remainder» to ascriptions of one or some combina-
tion of the following four categories: claim-right, liberty, power, immunity 84.
«In short, the modern vocabulary and grammar of rights is a many-face-
ted instrument for reporting and asserting the requirements or other impli-
cations of a relationship of justice from the point of view of the person(s) who 
benefit(s) from that relationship. It provides a way of talking about ‘what is 
just’ from a special angle: the viewpoint of the ‘other(s)’ to whom something 
(including, inter alia, freedom of choice) is owed or due, and who would be 
wronged if denied that something» 85.
Finnis is well aware that, when set against the historical backdrop, the 
concept of subjective rights is on the other, modern side of the «watershed» 
from the classic concept of «ius». Somewhere in crossing this «watershed» 
Aquinas’s primary meaning of «ius» – «the just thing itself» – has been trans-
formed by «relating it exclusively to the beneficiary of the just relationship» 86.
There are two crucial points to be made with regard to Finnis’s under-
standing of this crossing of the «watershed» from classical «ius» towards mod-
ern subjective rights.
In the first place, it should be highlighted that the main problem Finnis 
seems to perceive and respond to with regard to this shift of perspective is 
that, in the subsequent post-Hobbesian modern juridical scheme, the concept 
of «right» could be seen as altogether detached from «law» 87. Finnis never re-
84 Ibid., p. 199. Finnis claims that «rights of each of the four Hohfeldian types are spoken of by 
Aquinas». See Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», in Finnis, J., Philosophy of Law. Col-
lected Essays: volume IV, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 115-116. See also hohFeld, 
W.N., «Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning», Yale Law 
Journal, 23 (1913), pp. 28-59; id., «Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning», Yale Law Journal, 26 (1917), pp. 710-770.
85 Finnis, J., Natural Law..., op. cit., p. 205. Italics original.
86 Ibid., pp. 206-207. Italics original.
87 «This shift of perspective could be so drastic as to carry right-holders, and their rights, alto-
gether outside the juridical relationship which is fixed by law (moral or posited) and which 
establishes jus in Aquinas’s sense: ‘that which is just’. (...) Pushed as far as Hobbes’s purposes, 
this contrast between law and rights deprives the notion of rights of virtually all its normative 
significance. Hobbes wishes to say that one has most rights when one is in the ‘state of nature’, 
i.e. a vacuum of law and obligation (...)», ibid., pp. 207-208.
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ally sees any serious problem in the fact that the whole argumentative cluster 
of the classical concept of «ius» as «res iusta» is completely absent from the 
modern and contemporary perspective. Instead, he concentrates the rest of 
his analysis on the effort, scattered all across his works, to restate the structural 
value of «law» (natural and positive) for the constitution of the juridical phe-
nomenon and then graft upon it a Hohfeldian scheme of subjective rights. This is 
a very symptomatic and crucial systematic move to be taken into account in 
our later analysis on his focal point of juridicity. Finnis seems to be convinced 
that Aquinas’s concept of «ius» and the concept of «right» in general is wholly 
fixed by law, natural moral or positive law.
«So, if I have a natural – as we would now say, human – right I have it by 
virtue of natural law {ius naturale}; if I have a legal right I have it by virtue 
of positive law {ius positivum}, usually the law specifically of my own state 
{ius civile}. Thus law, natural or positive, is the basis for one’s right(s) {ratio 
iuris}...» 88
The «objective just relationship» that Villey conceived as the structural 
center of the self-standing classical concept of «ius» is, really, less than es-
sential to juridical discourse in Finnis’s scheme, on both sides of the «water-
shed» 89. The lack of it does not impoverish juridical discourse in any signifi-
cant way. The element which is, instead, according to Finnis, truly central and 
perennial in any classic, modern or contemporary account of «ius» is reflected 
in the second part of Finnis’s definition of the concept – «ensemble of juridical 
relationships established by rules» 90.
«These two main meanings of ius – right(s) and law(s) – are rationally 
connected. To say that someone has a right is to make a claim about what 
practical reasonableness requires of somebody (or everybody) else. But one’s 
practical reasonableness is guided and shaped by principles and norms, 
in the first instance by the principles of natural reason, i.e. of natural law 
– lex naturalis or, synonymously, ius naturale – and then by any relevant and 
88 Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 
135.
89 Finnis acknowledges that the classical concept of «ius» did, in fact, contain the meaning of the 
«objective just proportion» within its conceptual structure. He even cites the afore-mentioned 
ius altius non tollendi passage that represented Villey’s frequent argument for his own theory. See 
Finnis, J., Natural Law..., op. cit., p. 209. 
90 Ibid., p. 208. Italics mine.
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authoritative rules which have given to natural law some specific determina-
tio for a given community: positive law, i.e. lex positiva or, synonymously, ius 
positivum, usually ius civile» 91.
Perhaps with even greater vigour, in Natural Law and Natural Rights and 
in Aquinas the Australian professor reiterates his initial critiques of Villey’s 
systematic reading of «ius» as an autonomous concept from «lex» in the texts 
of Aquinas and Roman jurists. Although such view is not completely unintel-
ligible for Finnis (we are before two «distinct notions, but closely related»), 
it is, in his opinion, grossly «exaggerated» and misleading in its implied dis-
tinctions «between law and morality, and between justice and the principles of 
practical reasonableness» 92.
In the second place, throughout his works Finnis is very explicit with re-
gard to his own position in the crossing of the «watershed» from «ius» towards 
modern subjective rights. Indeed, he will never again mention «the just thing 
itself» as Aquinas’s primary meaning of «ius», as he did in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights. Once he structurally secured the concept of law (natural and 
positive) as underscoring and, indeed, central to the concept of «right», Finnis 
finds essentially no problem in reading Aquinas’s treatment of «ius» through 
the lens of predominantly subjectivist hermeneutics. Thus, in Aquinas’s argu-
ments on justice as allocation to each his right (suum cuique tribuere), Finnis 
paradigmatically identifies an inherently subjectivist structure of the concept 
of «ius».
«(...) [I]t is a sheer mistake to claim, as some have, that [Aquinas] lacked 
or repudiated the concept of rights in the modern sense, in which a right 
is ‘subjective’ in the sense of belonging to someone (the subject of the 
right). When he defines justice as the steady willingness to give to others 
what is theirs, Aquinas immediately goes on to treat that phrase as synon-
ymous with their right (ius suum); hence he treats a right/rights (ius/iura) 
as subjective» 93.
91 Finnis, J., Aquinas..., op. cit., pp. 134-135.
92 See id., Natural Law..., op. cit., p. 228. «Some twentieth-century commentators have thought 
that Aquinas had in mind a distinction in meaning between ius used in this sense and lex. But 
he had no interest whatever in making such a distinction, and there is no masked teaching to 
be found below the surface of his discussions of ius and lex (or anywhere else in his work)». See 
Finnis, J., Aquinas..., op. cit., p. 134.
93 id., «A Grand Tour...», op. cit., p. 116.
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«(...) One cannot properly think of ius without thinking of the other to 
whom an act, forbearance, or acceptance is, in justice, owed. (...) Which 
other? The one who, as Aquinas promptly and constantly says, has the rele-
vant ius. Thus ius can closely match our word ‘right’, signifying something 
someone has. Having begun q. 57 by identifying ius as the object of justice, 
Aquinas, in q. 58 a. 1c, defines justice as willingness to accord to the other 
his or her right {ius suum}, or synonymously, what is his or hers {suum}. How 
can it be denied that, as something that belongs to the person who has it, ius 
is ‘subjective’» 94?
«To say that jus is something people, one by one, have is to say that it is 
‘subjective’ in the sense that it belongs to subjects (persons)» 95.
Situating himself firmly on the modern and contemporary side of the para-
digmatic «watershed», Finnis is convinced that «there should be no question in 
wanting to put the clock back». When underscored by a sub-structure of practi-
cal reasonableness, the modern idiom of rights is simply «more supple», «more 
specific in its standpoint or perspective» and «capable of being used with more 
differentiation and precision than the pre-modern use of ‘the right’ (jus)» 96.
94 Finnis, J., «Aquinas on Ius and Hart on Rights: A Response to Tierney», The Review of Pol-
itics, 64 (2002), p. 408. This particular Finnis’s quote originated in a debate with Brian Tier-
ney, who criticized precisely this part of the theoretical account of his Australian colleague, 
namely, the reading of a modern, subjectivist sense of right in Aquinas’s classical concept of 
«ius». As we mentioned before, Tierney is very clear in his claims that, although references 
to «ius» as «facultas» or «potestas» were in fact operative in the juridical language of Aquinas’s 
time, «right» cannot be said to have a subjectivist implication in the teachings of the Angelic 
Doctor. Tierney claims that Aquinas «either ignored the subjective meaning or deliberatley 
excluded it» and that one cannot find any reason for Aquinas’s choice in favour of this exclusi-
on «if it was a meaning that he had intended to convey all along». See tieRney, B., «Author’s 
Rejoinder», pp. 416-417. 
95 See the «Postscript» in Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 423. In the same ex-
planatory section of the second edition of his Natural Law and Natural Rights, in which he 
comments the original text chapter by chapter, Finnis affirms that «Aquinas’s definition of 
justice, and his prior identification of jus as the very object (proximate goal and rationale) of 
justice, entail that (...) in his view, jus (a right) is something that belongs to the subjects of law 
or moral relationships, and therefore has the essential characteristic of a subjective right». 
Ibid., p. 465. 
96 Ibid., p. 209. In a number of subsequent occasions Finnis revised his position on the impor-
tance of the perception of the shift of meaning in the term «right» and its terminological 
predecessors. «But while it is clear that this shift is correlated with (...) modern conceptions 
or attitudes which can be vaguely called ‘individualist’, it seems unlikely that the differing 
semantics and logic of droit and droits has any truly fundamental importance». See Finnis, J., 
«‘Natural Law’», in Reason in Action. Collected Essays: Volume I, Oxford University Press, Ox-
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3.3. Finnis’s Concept of «Right» and the Focal Point of Juridicity
«Thus law, natural or positive, is the basis for one’s right(s) {ratio iuris}, 
precisely because the proposition «X has such-and-such a right» cannot 
rationally be other than a conclusion from, or a determinatio of, practical 
reason’s principles» 97.
In Finnis’s systematic account of the juridical phenomenon the concept 
of «right» seems to comprise a twofold structure.
In the first place, a «right» in the subjective sense is structurally con-
stituted through a simple act of rational conclusion, or determinatio from the 
principles of practical reason. Subjective right is the claim itself – rationally 
arrived at through logical conclusion or determination – about what practical 
reasonableness requires of somebody (or everybody). Subjective rights repre-
sent, therefore, not only terminological «additions» – implied in the classical 
period, and explicitly characteristic of the modern age 98 – but also, on a struc-
tural level, essentially juridical extensions of natural (or positive) law which, 
in contrast, stands as a durable foundation of juridicity. This is, however, a 
subsidiary feature of the semantics of «ius».
The main feature in the structure of the concept of «right» is Finnis’s un-
derstanding of the «right» in the objective sense: the normative basis for sub-
jective right-claims. The concept of «law», natural or positive, comprehen-
sively constitutes this feature. Law has, according to Finnis, a kind of priority 
to rights, because «what justice requires is settled by law – moral (natural) 
or positive» 99. In his most recent reflection on the topic he firmly highlights 
that «the object of the the virtue of justice (...) is rights – in the central sense 
of that English term, the sense in which its correlative is duties, that is, duties 
of justice resulting from the directives of natural and, where pertinent, just 
positive law» 100.
ford, 2011, p. 207. «Natural Law and Natural Rights treats the differences between Thomistic 
and modern idiom in right(s)-discourse as more significant and interesting than I now think 
they are». See Finnis, J., «Aquinas on Ius and Hart on Rights», p. 410. «The ‘watershed’ 
(...) must be regarded as much more a matter of appearance and idiom than of conceptual, let 
alone political or philosophical, substance». See Finnis, J., Natural Law...», op. cit., p. 465.
97 Finnis, J., Aquinas..., op. cit., p. 135.
98 id., Natural Law..., op. cit., p. 221.
99 id., Aquinas..., op. cit., p. 135.
100 id., «Grounding Human...», op. cit., p. 214. Italics original.
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Thus, much like in Tierney’s analysis, although with certain systematic 
differences 101, Finnis’s theory focalizes juridicity – the constitutive factor of 
the juridical dimension of facts and relations between persons – in the law, 
natural or positive just law.
3.4.  A Critical Assessment of Finnis’s Concept of «Right» and the Focal Point 
of Juridicity
There are several arguments that could be adressed to Finnis’s theoret-
ical account from the perspective of Villey’s (and, as we shall see later, also 
Hervada’s) theory.
The first critique regards his presentation of Thomas Aquinas’s teach-
ings on the matters pertinent to the very concept of «right». Although Finnis 
highlights that many of his views owe to his understanding of Aquinas’s own 
writings on these topics 102, we saw that Villey and Tierney strongly oppose 
such claims by affirming that some Finnis’s thesis are simply not compatible 
with Aquinas’s 103.
A second critique may be established along the lines of Villey’s argu-
mentation, and addressed to both Tierney’s and Finnis’s respective theories 
of «right». Although Tierney and Finnis differ in particular instances of their 
respective theories, they nonetheless seem to arrive at similar conclusions as 
regards the focal point of juridicity. Namely, both authors assume that it is 
the law (natural or positive just law) that, in the ultimate analysis, constitutes 
the specifically juridical dimension, and, thus, essentially situates facts and re-
lations in the realm of juridical obligation (or obligation of justice) between 
persons.
101 Besides the objection to Finnis’s subjectivist reading of Aquinas’s «ius», Tierney criticizes the 
Australian jurist’s claims that natural rights can be readily, almost automatically derived from 
natural law, by way of rational conclusions and determinations. For Tierney, as we have already 
seen, natural rights could, indeed, be compatible with natural law’s permissive structure, but 
without establishing an immediate derivation of the former from the latter. See tieRney, B., 
«Old Problems and Recent Approaches», p. 394.
102 Finnis, J., Aquinas..., op. cit., pp. viii-ix.
103 In one textual locus Finnis even labels a modality of presentation of the classical concept of «ius» 
as the «Tierney-Villey characterization», given the convergences of these two, otherwise mutu-
ally critical, authors in their consideration of his arguments as clearly divergent from Aquinas’s 
texts. See Finnis, J., «Aquinas on Ius...», op. cit., p. 408.
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Villey would have addressed at least two sets of arguments in favour of 
his thesis that such an approach amounts to a position which could fall under 
the rubric of «legalism».
On one hand, neither Tierney nor Finnis perceive any systematic ne-
cessity to postulate (or, from Villey’s perspective, to restate) an intermediary 
dimension of classical «ius» between the law (natural or positive just law) and 
subjective right-claim on which a «thing» – «res» – would be constituted as 
due within an objectively just relation between persons. For Finnis, Villey’s 
«droit naturel» amounts to a superfluous conceptual cluster of content already 
sufficiently secured at the structural level of «law» (i.e. of the principles of 
practical reason) 104 and practically «superseded in living usage» 105. In a culture 
which understands rights in an overtly individualistic or relativistic fashion, 
he is convinced that the main imperative is to conceptually reconnect the lan-
guage of rights to the principles of practical reasonableness 106.
On the other hand, Finnis’s imputations that Villey had misconstrued 
distinctions between the juridical and moral dimension (or, as he himself 
says, «between law and morality») would certainly leave a lot to be desired 
if we would view them from the perspective of Villey’s theory. Although, as 
we have seen, Finnis discards Villey’s conception of the juridical dimension 
as superfluous, he is nevertheless convinced to be faithful to Aquinas’s own 
understanding of such a dimension. At first sight, he seems to adopt his own 
differentation of the two, moral and juridical dimensions.
«Isn’t Aquinas primarily interested in the moral uprightness, the just cha-
racter, of the duty-bearer, not in the right(s) of the one to whom the duty is 
owed? Not at all. (...) For he makes it clear that justice’s primary demand is 
that the relevant «external acts» be done (...) So: the good of justice {bonum 
iustitiae} is not the ‘clean hands’ (better: clean heart) of those who are to do 
justice but rather – what Aquinas puts at the head of his treatise on justice 
104 «Undeniably, what is just as between persons in relation to some matter is law’s direct concern. 
But such relationships are not so fundamental that they cannot be explicated and shown to be 
just(ified) by reference to the principles of practical reason...» See Finnis, J., «Practical Reason’s 
Foundations», in Finnis, J., Reason in Action..., op. cit., p. 21. Italics original.
105 «The distinction is simply that the loi naturelle is as such the set of reasons (principles) which 
justify the assertion of the droit naturel in question. The latter is the former in its application to a 
specified class of persons and subject-matter. There is distinction but no question of opposition, 
still less ‘opposition capitale’». Finnis, J., «‘Natural Law’...», op. cit., p. 207. Italics of non-French 
words mine.
106 Ibidem.
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– justice’s very object: the right(s) of the human person entitled to the equal 
treatment we call justice» 107.
«In Aquinas’s understanding of justice, rights are as fundamental as du-
ties, and duties as fundamental as rights. We have duties which are not du-
ties of justice, so duty is the wider concept. But when a duty is to another 
human person, it is a duty of justice, and that other person’s right is its very 
object or point» 108.
These arguments clearly imply that Finnis understands the categories of 
«otherness» («alteritas») and «outwardness» as somehow foundational for the 
distinction of the juridical phenomenon from a purely moral perspective 109. 
The lack of a more systematic account of the constitutive factors of juridicity 
as well as of any implication of Villey’s concept of «ius», however, seems to 
lock Finnis’s work in a framework in which morality of law is directly translated 
into juridical categories of what is subjectively due by virtue of such law. And 
when he does, in fact, attempt to postulate a specifically juridical dimension of 
the legal phenomenon, Finnis’s investigations are confined strictly to the iden-
tification of such a dimension in the concept of law 110. Hence, his understand-
ing of the juridical dimension largely differs from Villey’s tripartition of this 
dimension in prior objective order (identified as the principle of practical rea-
107 Finnis, J., Aquinas..., op. cit., pp. 136-137.
108 Ibid., p. 170. He reiterates the argument in Finnis, J., «Aquinas on Ius...», op. cit., p. 409.
109 Perhaps this testifies to his perception that a specifically juridical dimension should be built 
around certain elements constitutive of juridicity, such as those which Villey refers to when he 
affirms that «right consists in a proportio between res exteriores distributed among a plurality of 
persons». See villey, M., «Si la théorie générale...», op. cit., p. 428.
110 Finnis reports how legal positivism in its most «pure» form amounts to a position where any 
necessary connection between law and morality is virtually inexistent. A natural law theory that 
can enter into a constructive dialogue with more moderate, contemporary currents of legal pos-
itivism, assumes a systematic position according to which positive laws are, indeed, social facts 
which count as genuine reasons to action insofar as «morality makes their social sources and 
their social-fact content count», with the imperative of avoiding any reduction of «legal theory 
without remainder to ethics». See Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour...», op. cit.,  p. 105, 111. In another 
assessment of legal positivism, he affirms that «the fact of positivity, without the support of some 
prior normative principle, can yield neither a rational claim on the deliberations of judge or ci-
tizen nor a ground for construing the law as a system». But what normative principle does Finnis 
refer to? Although human law is not a mere conclusion from moral premises, «its positing 
and the recognition of its positivity (...) cannot be understood without reference to the moral 
principles». See Finnis, J., «The Truth in Legal Positivism», in id., Philosophy of Law, p. 186. 
The focus of Finnis’s position seems always to be on morality and law, without any reference to 
a juridical dimension not readily identifiable with law, or ascribable to his concept of rights as its 
mere extensions. 
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sonableness in Finnis’s theory, with an unclear differentiation between moral 
and juridical dimensions), the objective just relation (which Finnis discards as 
superfluous and instead postulates a rather weak account of subjective rights 
as extensions from law) and the act of justice itself («to give»).
Finnis’s interchangeable use of «ius» and «lex», wherein «lex» is primar-
ily referred to the natural (moral) law as the basis for positive human law, 
makes it difficult to establish a specifically juridical dimension of natural law, 
as opposed to a strictly moral one. This distinction was, indeed, foundational 
for Villey. Nowhere does Finnis satisfactorily and systematically explain how 
exactly do the conclusions and determinations from the norms of practical 
reasonableness constitute a specifically juridical «due» as distinct in object 
from the moral «ought». For example, it is difficult to establish a clear distinc-
tion between respective moral and juridical dimensions in the following right-
claim: the right not to be positively lied to in any situation in which factual 
communication is reasonably expected 111. Even when enumerating rights that 
could be taken as always implying also a specifically juridical dimension, such 
as the «right not to be deprived or required to be deprived of one’s procreative 
capacity» 112, Finnis does not provide us with any further juridical justification, 
other than a normative cluster of the principles of practical reasonableness. 
According to Villey’s conceptual categories, this cluster would provide us with 
a good account of the existence of a prior fixed order and of the possibility of 
its extension in a claim to bring about the act of justice. But the intermediary 
dimension that Villey understands as constitutive to the nucleus of juridicity is 
absent from Finnis’s theory.
The third and final critique which could be adressed to Finnis’s concept 
of «right» revolves around the fact that his vision of subjective rights bespeaks 
an almost automatic and somewhat uncritical inheritance of a predominant-
ly individualistic philosophical context in which subjective rights originated. 
Only the modern side of the «watershed», where the juridical phenomenon 
was understood to be concentrated in the sphere of the individual and his 
powers, could yield a framework of thinking about law as not only a source of 
moral obligation, but also as an immediate foundation of juridical obligation 
conceived in an exclusively subjectivistic fashion 113.
111 Finnis, J., Natural Law..., op. cit., p. 225.
112 Ibidem.
113 See deMeleMestRe, G., «La réception de l’interprétation française des theories du droit na-
turel dans le monde anglo-saxon», Archives de philosophie du droit, 58 (2015), pp. 405-406.
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4. javieR heRvada, Right as «Res iusta» (a just Thing) 
and classical juRidical RealisM
In the simplest line of argumentation, readily translatable into phenom-
enological categories close to experience and with sharp philosophical vigour 
that permits a clearer understanding of the specificity of the juridical dimen-
sion, the Spanish civil and canonical jurist, Javier Hervada, elaborated a re-
statement of the central reference point of classical juridical realism: right is 
primarily a thing, «res iusta» 114. His account of the concept of «right» is rooted 
in the understanding that Aquinas, in his Treatise on Justice (S.Th. II-II, q. 
57-58) in Summa Theologiae 115, presented the juridical phenomenon principal-
ly as a thing, «res», a corporeal or incorporeal thing, which is due to the subject 
because it has been attributed to him 116.
4.1.  The Centrality and the Systematic Context of «Right» in Classical 
Juridical Realism
Within the philosophical context of classical juridical realism – in the 
strict sense of the term 117 – Hervada adopts a twofold starting point en route to 
his presentation of «right». On one hand, he firmly contextualizes his analy-
sis of the juridical phenomenon within the conceptual realm of justice – «ius 
suum cuique tribuendi» – where right is the object of justice 118, as we already 
114 heRvada, J., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., pp. 25-31; id., What is Law? The Modern Response of 
Juridical Realism: An Introduction to Law, Wilson & Lafleur Ltée, Montréal, 2009, pp. 43-44, 
48-49; id., Lecciones propedéuticas de filosofía del derecho, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1992, pp. 198-199, 
230-232; id., «Apuntes para una exposición del realismo jurídico clásico», Persona y Derecho, 18 
(1988), pp. 284-285.
115 See schouPPe, J.-P., «El realismo jurídico de Javier Hervada», in Natura, Ius, Ratio: Estudios 
sobre la filosofía jurídica de Javier Hervada, Rivas, P. (ed.), Ara Editores, Lima, 2005, p. 36. For a 
more extensive account of Hervada’s philosophical itinerary, and his intellectual «conversion» 
to classical juridical realism, see del Pozzo, M., L’evoluzione della nozione di diritto nel pensiero 
canonistico di Javier Hervada, EDUSC, Roma, 2005, pp. 47-73, 125-172, 329-354.
116 heRvada, J., «Le droit dans le réalisme juridique classique», Droits, 10 (1989), p. 31.
117 Classical juridical realism is a current in philosophy of law whose authors «not only apprehend 
the reality (moderate philosophical realism) in order to discover in it the most fundamental nu-
cleus of juridicity inherent in the very being of persons (juridical realism in a broad sense of the 
term), but also consider that juridical science is the art of ‘that which is just’ and that the proper 
sense of ‘right’ is that of a good which is due in justice..». See schouPPe, J.-P., «El realismo 
jurídico...», op. cit., pp. 41-42.
118 schouPPe, J.-P., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., p. 27.
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saw in the exposition of Villey’s account of «ius». However, this conceptual 
context is only a backdrop to Hervada’s experiential, almost phenomenologi-
cal, starting point of grasping the juridical phenomenon.
«That point of departure is none other than an easily verifiable social 
fact: things are attributed to different subjects, in other words, things are distri-
buted (...) Justice does not attribute things, but follows the fact that they are 
already attributed» 119.
The act that is foundational of «right», i.e., which renders a thing some-
body’s suum and establishes a relation of «suitas» between a thing and its ti-
tle-holder, is the act of attribution or distribution of things 120. This act is de-
termined by the category of «title», or «that which causes the attribution of 
a thing to a specific subject» 121, for example, legislation, custom, contract, 
juridical fact or human nature. Despite the fact that it is, indeed, foundational, 
the relation of «suitas» does not yet formally constitute «right» 122. The consti-
tutive factor of juridicity, which Hervada understands as formally constituting 
a thing as «right», is dependent on the property of a thing to be or to be able to be 
in the sphere of power of another person or susceptible to his interference 123. The rela-
tion of «suitas», therefore, conjugated with this property of the thing (suscep-
tible to be in the sphere of power or interference of another) creates a relation 
of debt with regard to one who interferes or could interfere (the debtor), as 
well as his correspondent obligation to re-establish or respect the situation of 
non-interference 124. This structure of the juridical phenomenon contains all 
the elements characteristic of juridicity 125: the foundational relation of «suitas» 
as the effect of attribution by a title, the outwardness of things 126, the otherness 
119 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
120 heRvada, J., «Exposición del realismo...», op. cit., p. 289. 
121 id., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., p. 34.
122 id., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., pp. 202, 231.
123 id., «Exposición del realismo...», op. cit., p. 285; id., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., p. 231.
124 id., Lecciones propedéuticas, pp. 202-203.
125 This list of the essentialities of juridicity is a synthesis of Hervada’s own position on this top-
ic. See heRvada, J., «Exposición del realismo...», op. cit., p. 292. For a congenial exhaustive 
enumeration of the characteristic elements of juridicity, see del Pozzo, M., L’evoluzione della 
nozione..., op. cit., p. 346.
126 All of the things susceptible to be constituted as rights «must have a common characteristic: 
they are things that have an external dimension (res exteriores), which, in themselves or in their 
manifestations, spring from the intimate sphere of the subject». See heRvada, J., What is Law?, 
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characteristic of justice as a virtue of social – intersubjective – relation (which 
includes at least two subjects in a distinct complementary position wherein at 
least one of them is a debtor) 127, and, finally, the obligation arising from the 
relation of debt, as described above.
But where is the essence of the concept of «right» in this structure of 
juridical phenomenon? Now, «right» in the primary sense – the «suum», that 
which may be declared with regard to the title-holder as «his own», his «due» 
in the virtue of an exclusive attribution of a thing – is not a law, nor a subjec-
tive right. According to Hervada, «right» is each person’s own thing, the just 
thing, «res iusta». What constitutes the «suum» of the person owed in justice 
is the thing itself 128. In full accordance with the postulates of juridical realism 
in the strict sense, «right» cannot be understood as something that belongs to 
a purely formal, idealistic level, but has to be understood and fulfilled on the 
level of reality in all its radical givenness 129. Of course, «right» is not, ontolog-
ically speaking, the thing in itself, in its substance, but only insofar as attributed to 
a title-holder with whom another person is in a relation of debt 130. Things – all the 
things that are susceptible to be constituted as «right» – certainly maintain 
their substantial status 131. Nevertheless, the perception of «right» as a con-
crete thing is indispensable for its correct conceptual apprehension 132 and the 
«reification» of «right» does not imply a substantialization of a concept, but 
only a discovery of the foundation «in re» of that concept 133.
pp. 48-49. «The intimate sphere of man or his incommunicable – what remains outside of social 
relations – does not constitute ‘right’». See heRvada, J., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., p. 225. 
«Outwardness – this must be clear – does not necessarily mean that it is a thing that can be 
grasped, in itself, by the senses. It is sufficient that, in that it has some exterior manifestation, it 
be the object of human relations and, therefore, capable of being grasped or interfered with – 
directly or indirectly (...) – through others. For example, when we speak of a right to religious 
freedom, it is clear that we are not speaking of the act of faith, as if it could in itself be usurped 
by others. But, mediately it could be interfered with (...) in its manifestations, and a person may 
be the object of coercion». See heRvada, J., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., p. 26. 
127 «The relation of justice requires that each subject is radically ‘other’. If otherness is not perfect, 
a relation of justice in the proper sense cannot be established, since, to the degree that the sub-
jects are not radically ‘others’, there can be no full and perfect distinction between the ‘suum’ of 
each of them». See heRvada, J., «Exposición del realismo...», op. cit., p. 292.
128 heRvada, J., Critical Introduction...», op. cit., pp. 25-26.
129 See id., What is Law?..., op. cit., p. 47.
130 id., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., p. 198.
131 Ibid., p. 230.
132 schouPPe, j.-P., Le réalisme juridique, E. Story-Scientia, Bruxelles, 1987, p. 154.
133 del Pozzo, M., L’evoluzione della nozione..., op. cit., p. 349.
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Perhaps such a framework of the concept of «right» may seem rather dif-
ficult to conceive of, or even be scandalous to a person professionally or cul-
turally formed exclusively in a positivistic or individualistic concept of «right».
«(...) [H]e will probably feel called to correct me: the house is not a pro-
perty right, but its object; said otherwise, he would have to say that I have 
the property over the house. (...) In other words, at each step I have been 
confusing a right with its object. There is no such confusion, though» 134.
Under the rubric of «thing» Hervada truly does understand «right» pre-
cisely as the concrete individual thing – corporeal or incorporeal – attributed to 
somebody on the basis of a title, situated within the specific juridical reality in 
virtue of relation of debt. The thing is here understood in the broadest possi-
ble sense, as a universal convertible with being 135 for the purpose of reference 
to a concrete reality, and surely not for imparting an ontological status. «Res 
iusta», therefore, can be a car, a payment, a house, an hour of playing tennis 
on the tennis-court no. 2 in that particular recreational complex, a portion of 
food, a selected meal, free movement across a border, the use of a public road, 
a presence before a tribunal with a claim, good reputation, or enjoying an ex-
perience of hearing a concert on seat no. 24 in the fifth row of that particular 
concert venue at that particular time. And, yes, a person (with the necessary 
presupposition that a possible implication 136 of anything resembling a «reifi-
cation» of a person is completely excluded).
134 heRvada, J., What is Law?..., op. cit., pp. 43-44.
135 schouPPe, j.-P., Le réalisme juridique..., op. cit., p. 154.
136 heRvada, J., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., p. 25. As said before, the designation «thing» is not 
meant as a tool for conferring an ontological reality to something or somebody. It is, rather, 
understood in the broadest possible sense of reference to an already established concrete real-
ity in all the givenness of its ontological intensity, as opposed to an idealistic separation of the 
concept of «right» from reality. With regard to a person as «res iusta» – a thing due in justice, a 
«suum» – it must be highlighted that classical juridical realism seeks to express a juridical reality 
of how a concrete he or she may constitute a «res iusta», «something» owed in justice to another 
person, in a variety of juridical relations. For example, in marriage, the object of marital consent 
– indeed, a covenant not only a contract – are «the very persons of the spouses that mutually 
give and accept each other in their conjugality, that is, in that dimension of human existence 
inscribed in the primary sense of sexual differentiation». See eRRázuRiz, c. j., «El matrimonio 
como conjunction entre amor y derecho en una optica realista y personalista», Scripta Theologica, 
26 (1994), p. 1034. The spouses form an intentional motion towards marriage, but not with an 
act of will directed primarily towards the institution of marriage or towards the communion of 
life and love itself, but primarily towards «the person of the other spouse in his or her conjugal-
ity». See heRvada, J., «Esencia del matrimonio y consentimiento matrimonial», in id., Vetera 
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An important argument for the comprehension of Hervada’s juridical re-
alism against a false premise of substantialization of juridical phenomena 137 is 
the postulate of the focal point of juridicity as essentially a relation between 
a thing – «right» – and at least two persons, one who is the title-holder and 
to whom the thing is due in a relation of justice, and the other who is the 
debtor 138. As we mentioned before, it is precisely this relation that renders the 
thing a «right».
4.2.  The Systematic Locus of Subjective Rights and Law in Hervada’s 
Juridical Realism
Since in Hervada’s theoretical elaboration of classical juridical realism 
the primary meaning of «right» is reducible neither to subjective rights nor to 
law, it will be interesting to see what structural place the Spanish jurist assigns 
to these juridical concepts in his system.
Subjective rights as faculties or powers that the individual may claim over 
things, according to Hervada, certainly exist, but only as a consequence – a 
manifestation, a derived juridical meaning – of the primary meaning of «ius» 
as a just thing 139. They do not, in any terms, substitute the thing due in jus-
tice and, therefore, do not constitute a new kind of essence to the concept of 
«right» 140. It is, however, crucial to understand that the concept of subjective 
rights made its entrance to juridical doctrine precisely with the intention to 
substitute the realistic concept of right. This occurred in a philosophical con-
text which Hervada, together with Villey, ascribes to the doctrine of William 
et Nova: Cuestiones de derecho canonico y afines: 1958-2004, Navarra Gráfica Ediciones, Pamplona, 
2005, p. 937. The act of marital consent actualizes natural potentialities for conjugality inherent 
in the person’s respective masculinity or femininity, within a relational perspective towards the 
other person of the opposite sex. This same act converts the personal dominion of a spouse over 
his own personal structures of the capacity for conjugality in a «res» of the other spouse, in order 
to constitute, among other effects, a specifically juridical dimension of being due to each other in 
a spousal dimension. See Puig, F., La esencia del matrimonio a la luz del realismo jurídico, Navarra 
Gráfica Ediciones, Pamplona, 2004, pp. 235-248.
137 «The thing in itself is not ‘right’, but things are susceptible to constitute ‘right’». See del Poz-
zo, M., L’evoluzione della nozione..., op. cit., p. 56.
138 heRvada, J., Lecciones propedéuticas, p. 231.
139 id., «Exposición del realismo jurídico clásico», pp. 288-289. See also id., Lecciones propedéuti-
cas..., op. cit., p. 243.
140 id., What is Law?..., op. cit., pp. 45-46.
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Ockham 141. Ockham and his intellectual successors relegated the thing itself, 
«res», to a structural position where it is considered an object of «right», a 
reality over which the individual extends a moral faculty or power 142. The rad-
ical error of Ockhamian theory of subjective rights consists in its adherents’ 
inability to perceive that «right» and the thing – «res» – are not, in fact, sep-
arable. Such conceptual schism of reality would lead, and has, indeed, led to a 
constitution of «right» detached from the «res iusta». «Right» could, then, be 
conceived as perfectly claimable in its essential property of faculty or power, 
regardless of the concrete thing (which would become a secondary juridical 
phenomenon) and its being due: it would be due only insofar as it is claimed 143. 
Justice would, in such a theoretical scheme, essentially consist in giving to 
each his own faculty or power to claim, and not in giving the thing itself 144. 
How can subjective rights exist autonomously without any reference to the 
pre-existence of the «res iusta» and what would, in such a scheme, represent a 
foundation of such claimability?
Earlier, we saw how Villey did seem to imply that one could, in fact, 
postulate a juridical dimension of natural law 145, but then stopped short from 
proposing a systematic distinction and elaboration of such dimension of law. 
In Hervada’s system, law is an element of the juridical phenomenon precisely 
because of its relation with «right», that is, with the just thing 146. What does 
this relation consist in? The law, natural or positive, is the title which attrib-
utes certain things to the title-holders, and thus founds «right», insofar as 
those things are susceptible to be included in relations of debt 147. The norm 
of law is necessarily juridical in itself only insofar as it is, in its own specific 
way, structurally linked to all the elements of juridicity: foundational rela-
tion of «suitas», outwardness, otherness and, finally, the relation of debt. Her-
vada affirms that, within the broader term of natural law – which also includes 
141 heRvada, J., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., p. 239.
142 Ibid., p. 241.
143 Ibid., pp. 242-243. See also schouPPe, j.-P., Le réalisme juridique..., op. cit., p. 167.
144 heRvada, J., «Exposición del realismo...», op. cit., p. 289.
145 The idea is made almost explicit especially in villey, M., «Si la théorie générale...», op. cit., p. 
429. See also his various collateral arguments in villey, M., La formation de la pensée..., op. cit., 
pp. 592-606.
146 heRvada, J., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., pp. 122-124, 154-155. See also id., «Exposición del 
realismo jurídico clásico», pp. 294-295; id., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., pp. 531-535; id., 
What is Law?..., op. cit., pp. 142-145.
147 id., «Exposición del realismo...», op. cit., p. 294.
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a moral dimension of natural precepts, indeed, «the more relevant aspect of 
such normativity» 148 – some natural norms, however, have a specifically juridical 
dimension: those that state a duty of justice 149. These norms compose the jurid-
ical natural law 150. The importance of Hervada’s (perhaps unique) theoretical 
attempt to postulate a specifically juridical dimension of natural law might 
seem quantitatively underdeveloped, given the fact that Hervada dedicates 
very few arguments (and in a rather unsystematic way) to the elaboration of 
this matter. We believe that he himself has undergone a progressive growth 
in his understanding of the systematic position of the juridical dimension of 
natural law, and that, in certain ways, which transcend the concrete scope of 
this particular paper, he has not taken this aspect of his theory to its full argu-
mentative consequences.
5. Final cRitical ReMaRks on the couRse and Results 
oF the deBate RegaRding the concePt oF «Right» 
and the Focal Point oF juRidicity
All the presented authors could be said to subscribe to an «objectivist» 
account of juridical phenomenon, that is, to a classical juridical realism in the 
broad sense of the term 151. In short, they all endorse a juridical doctrine which 
affirms the existence of objective norms as expressions of the demands of jus-
tice, norms which, in turn, constitute criteria of legitimacy of positive law and 
structurally precede it. All the authors are in explicit or implicit argumentative 
dialogue between them. The theory of each of them may represent an argu-
mentative critique to the approach and system of the other.
First of all, among the four authors presented, Villey and Hervada could 
be categorized also as adherents of classical juridical realism in the strict sense. 
In contrast to Tierney and Finnis, they clearly affirm that there is a real struc-
tural distinction between «right» and law (reflected in separate treatises on 
each of these concepts in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae), and that the former is 
148 heRvada, J., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., p. 531.
149 id., Critical Introduction..., op. cit., p. 124. 
150 id., Lecciones propedéuticas..., op. cit., p. 532. See also id., What is Law?..., op. cit., pp. 143-144.
151 For definitions and differences between an «objectivist» juridical doctrine and classical juridical 
realism in the strict sense, see supra note 116. See also schouPPe, j.-P., Le réalisme juridique..., 
op. cit., pp. 110, 174-176; and id., «El realismo jurídico...», op. cit., pp. 41-42.
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not reducible to the latter. Subjective rights are, to both Villey and Hervada, 
derivations and particular analogical manifestations of the central significance 
of the concept of «right». The main characteristic of classical juridical realism 
in the strict sense is the identification of «right» with the thing due in justice on 
the basis of a relation of debt 152. We have seen that Hervada, and, to a certain, 
perhaps less elaborated 153, extent Villey, adhere to this position.
We have already presented Tierney’s and Finnis’s mutual critiques. Re-
gardless of their differences, these two authors also firmly remain on the side 
of what can be characterized as the «objectivist» account of juridical phenom-
enon (i.e., classical juridical realism in the broad sense of the term). They, how-
ever, do not postulate anything similar to Villey’s and Hervada’s real structural 
distinction between «right» and law. They disagree with Villey’s and Her-
vada’s view that «right» should not be reducible to law to the point where law 
is considered the essential carrier (or the focal point) of juridicity.
Each of the authors’ two argumentative blocks, Tierney and Finnis, on 
one side, and Villey and Hervada on the other, point to some necessary struc-
tural improvements of potentially deficient points in accounts of the concept 
of «right» of their interlocutors in the debate. After all, this seems to be the 
desired scope of each scholarly debate: an attempt to illuminate a contrasting 
view and expose one’s own to a potential critique in the hope that all partic-
ipants of the debate will acquire a deeper insight of the subject-matter along 
the way, even if they do not alter their initial views.
152 schouPPe, j.-P., Le réalisme juridique..., op. cit., p. 176; id., «El realismo jurídico...», op. cit., 
p. 42. See also del Pozzo, M., L’evoluzione della nozione...», op. cit., p. 135.
153 According to an ongoing academic debate in this particular matter, Villey’s adherence to realism 
in the strict sense of the term could be limited and compromised by his frequent references to 
«right» as predominantly a relation – «objective just relation» – that is, as an ordered proportion 
between external things distributed between persons, rather than a thing. According to this view, 
Villey seems to employ the reference to the thing in definitions of the concept of «right» only 
in a derivative, posterior sense; namely, when «right» as essentially a relation is seen from the 
perspective of the individual as his «just share». For this side of the debate, see schouPPe, j.-P., 
Le réalisme juridique..., op. cit., pp. 136-137; and id., «Réflexions sur la conception...», op. cit., pp. 
153-154. On the other hand, it has also been affirmed that Hervada, indeed, seems to go further 
than Villey in elaborating details of philosophical and especially juridical distinctions between 
juridicity and «right». In Hervada, juridicity is, essentially a relation, while «right» is always 
defined in its primary reference to the thing as its substance (with a clear distinction between, 
as we have already seen, the substance of the thing and the substance of «right»). If we keep in 
perspective Hervada’s more juridical approach as well as Villey’s difficult and polemical context 
of having to affirm «right» as both, a «just relation» contra subjectivism in general, and as a «just 
thing» contra the concept of «right» as essentially subjective rights, than the views of two authors 
can be viewed as, indeed, convergent. See sol, T., «La notion de droit...», op. cit., pp. 338-342.
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Hervada (as well as Villey) insists that the contemporary «objectivist» ac-
count of the juridical phenomenon should structurally distance itself from re-
serving the concept of «right» exclusively to subjective rights, as well as from 
consideration of law as the focal point of juridicity. The focus of the concept 
of «right» should, instead, return to the just thing itself. Tierney’s and Finnis’s 
respective positions on the concept of «right» lack altogether classical jurid-
ical realism’s intermediary dimension between the concept of law and rights 
understood as, essentially, subjective rights. It is difficult to clearly perceive 
what is specifically juridical, as clearly distinct from exclusively moral, in their 
accounts of natural law and individual rights. In their systems we encounter 
only post-Ockhamian essential juridical entities – subjective rights – objective-
ly rooted in moral foundations that have a normative structure. Villey labelled 
this approach as «legalistic», despite its clearly «objectivist» postulates. It is 
difficult not to wonder how much Tierney’s and Finnis’s theoretical positions 
would benefit from conceiving «right» as essentially the just thing, as well as 
from the removal of the focal point of juridicity away from the law towards 
classical realism’s relation of debt between persons. The concept of law would 
not be diminished or in any way compromised by such integration. It could, 
instead, be systematically interrelated to the just thing itself and oriented more 
towards Aquinas’s genuine realistic concept of «right». Subjective rights could, 
then, only constitute a derivative – important and inherent, but not primary – 
structural moment of «right» which is necessarily arising from juridicity.
On the other hand, Tierney’s, and especially Finnis’s theory can be con-
sidered as an invitation and, indeed, an imperative to intellectual successors of 
Villey and Hervada for developing a more systematic account of natural law 
in classical juridical realism. The fact that Aquinas himself treated concepts of 
«right» and law systematically and textually in their separate respective doc-
trinal loci of his Summa Theologiae does not mean that he understood the two 
things, «lex» and «ius», as elements of two autonomous, absolutely non-con-
vergent, juridical and moral dimensions. Villey rarely hints at the need to pos-
tulate a specifically juridical dimension of natural law. Hervada is more explicit 
on the subject, and in various, though somewhat underdeveloped arguments 
integrates the element of juridical natural law into his theory. In a theory that 
represents a contemporary restatement of classical juridical realism it could 
well be that a systematic fully-fledged integration of juridical natural law in all 
its structural consequences is precisely what is most lacking. Once the con-
cept of «right» as a «just thing» is secured as the central feature and, indeed, 
hermeneutical key to the whole system, the next logical systematic step seems 
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to resolve itself into a restatement also of Aquinas’s doctrine of law, especially 
natural law, in its juridical dimensions. Perhaps this would render thomistic 
juridical realism itself more intelligible to those who currently subscribe to it 
only in a broad sense of the term.
Hervada’s analysis of the structure of juridicity is an important contri-
bution to be taken into serious account in establishing a point of contact be-
tween the two argumentative blocks. As we saw earlier, Hervada’s focalization 
of juridicity in the relation of debt between persons with regard to the thing 
constituted as «just thing» points to both a prior attribution of the thing to the 
title-holder (through a title from which a relation of «suitas» arises) as well as 
towards a posterior structural moment of subjective right-claim, without be-
ing reducible to each of these moments. The adherents of the classical juridi-
cal realism in the strict sense could, indeed, improve on providing a systematic 
account of the moment of attribution of the thing through an elaboration of 
juridical natural law as the title of attribution. At the same time, Finnis, Tier-
ney and their intellectual successors could benefit from integrating into their 
account a specifically juridical dimension between the structural moment of 
attribution through a title (law, natural and positive, among other titles) and 
the subjective right-claim. Of course, such integration would require some-
thing resembling an authentic intellectual «conversion» to classical juridical 
realism in a strict sense, wherein «right» is each person’s own thing, the just 
thing, «res iusta». Hervada would certainly be the first to admit that he himself 
once underwent a «conversion» of this kind 154.
154 For a more detailed account of the intellectual «conversion» of Javier Hervada during the sum-
mer of 1980 as, indeed, a discovery of a new hermeneutical «quid» in the form of classical 
juridical realism within the scheme of his previous position (which he himself labelled as «con-
ceptual» classical realism centred around relational juridical structures of social reality inspired 
on his previous understanding of Thomism), see del Pozzo, M., L’evoluzione della nozione..., op. 
cit., pp. 47-49, 125-132, 135-138, 329-333. See also the words of Hervada himself published in 
the Appendix of Del Pozzo’s work, at pp. 588-597.

